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Disrupting Regulation, Regulating Disruption:
The Politics of Uber in the United States
Platform companies disrupt not only the economic sectors they
enter, but also the regulatory regimes that govern those sectors. We
examine Uber in the United States as a case of regulating this
disruption in different arenas: cities, state legislatures, and judicial
venues. We find that the politics of Uber regulation does not
conform to existing models of regulation. We describe instead a
pattern of disrupted regulation, characterized by a consistent
challenger-incumbent cleavage, in two steps. First, an existing
regulatory regime is not deregulated but successfully disregarded by
a new entrant. Second, the politics of subsequently regulating the
challenger leads to a dual regulatory regime. In the case of Uber,
disrupted regulation takes the form of challenger capture, an elitedriven pattern, in which the challenger has largely prevailed. It is
further characterized by the surrogate representation of dispersed
actors—customers and drivers—who do not have autonomous
power and who rely instead on alignment with the challenger and
incumbent. In its surrogate capacity in city and state regulation, Uber
has frequently mobilized large numbers of customers and drivers to
lobby for policy outcomes that allow it to continue to provide service
on terms it finds acceptable. Because drivers have reaped less
advantage from these alignments, labor issues have been taken up in
judicial venues, again primarily by surrogates (usually plaintiffs’
attorneys) but to date have not been successful.

The disruption brought by the new labor platform economy has been both welcomed as a
process of creative destruction and resisted as trampling on well-established regulations
that protect the interests of workers and the public. Platform companies increase efficiency
in the provision of services. They may also disrupt the economic sectors they enter and
existing regulatory regimes. Regulators must classify and create rules for the new
phenomenon of platform companies. This article examines Uber as a case of this disruption
to analyze the politics of regulatory response. We argue that the main extant models of the
politics of regulation do not fit the Uber case, which we analyze instead as a case of
challenger capture: a form of “disrupted regulation” in which the new entrant largely
prevails.
Uber is one of the most successful hi-tech companies and is the dominant player in the ridehailing sector. Within 3 years of its launch in 2012, UberX, Uber’s most popular service,
grew remarkably, reaching nearly half a million active drivers in 150 cities in the United
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States.1 It disrupted a century-old taxi industry, resulting in a sharp decline in medallion
values, taxi driver income, and taxi ridership in US cities.2 Uber entered urban markets
claiming to be a “technology company” and operated in disregard of taxi regulations. It
thereby disrupted the ride-hailing market and challenged regulations that both controlled
entry and fares and imposed consumer protection and safety requirements. How, then, did
government respond?
Existing analyses of regulation generally conform to what we may call the industrial
capture, public interest regulation, and deregulatory models. The industrial capture model,
pioneered by Stigler, puts in opposition the private vs. public (or producer vs. consumer)
interests.3 It argues that concentrated private actors with high stakes use a variety of
strategies to influence policy and thwart regulation in the public interest. Trumbull, to the
contrary, argues that state regulation can serve the public interest when diffuse interests
are represented by advocacy groups or activists, such as consumer rights organizations that
form alliances with the state.4 The third model responds in part to the deregulatory turn
since the 1980s. Carpenter and Moss present a model of “corrosive capture,” in which
regulated “firms push the regulatory process in a ‘weaker’ direction” through reduced
“formulation, application, or enforcement” of existing regulations.5
Each of these models has proposed answers to a number of questions: what are the main
interest cleavages; which interests tend to be served; and how. The Uber model of disrupted
regulation presents a different combination of answers than is suggested by any one of
these models. Far from a unitary actor, the private interest must be disaggregated. One
cleavage pits pro-regulation incumbents against anti-regulation challengers, as noted by
Vogel. 6 A second is the classic intra-challenger cleavage between labor and capital. In
addition, the relationship of private and public interests is characterized by neither their
opposition, prominent in the capture literature, nor their congruity, as in the pro-consumer,
free-market approach that underlies some anti-rent-seeking deregulation assumptions.
The pattern is similar to what Carpenter and Moss call “weak capture,” in that “firms render
regulation less robust than…what the public interest would recommend,” but “the public is
still served.”7 However, Uber regulation differs from their model of “corrosive capture” in
that the regulated industry (taxis) does not favor deregulation. Instead, the anti-regulation
disrupter is a competitor that defines itself as a different industry and not subject to the
extant regulatory regime. Further, to the extent the overall ride-hailing sector can be
considered deregulated, the politics is quite different: the state does not act primarily
through administrative agencies nor through the other channels Carpenter and Moss
discuss.8 Finally, contra Trumbull, though the public interest is served by providing a
1

The Uber company began operations earlier in 2009 as UberCab, an app for licensed black car and
limousine drivers. We analyze here the “peer-to-peer” UberX model, launched in 2012 and refer to it as Uber
and UberX interchangeably.
2
Madhani 2017. Berger et al. 2017.
3
Stigler 1971.
4
Trumbull 2006, 2012. In analyzing regulatory policies that may produce pro-consumer outcomes, Trumbull
(2012:23-25) focuses on three key actors (the state, industry, and social activists) and outlines three types of
coalitions composed of combinations of two. Two of these produce private arrangements (industry selfregulation, and consumer-industry arrangements), and only a coalition between the state and consumer
activists (or mobilized NGOs, which the government supports or even helps to form) is said to produce proconsumer state regulatory policy.
5
Carpenter 2014, 154; Carpenter and Moss 2014, 17.
6
Vogel 2018.
7
Carpenter and Moss 2014, 12, 16.
8
Carpenter and Moss 2014, 17.
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desired service, social activists and public interest advocacy organizations play almost no
part, and the industry-consumer coalition (or the mobilization of consumers by and on
behalf of Uber) is activated to oppose a pro-consumer regulation that Uber argues would
cause it to leave the market.
We analyze Uber as a model of disrupted regulation, which has two phases. In the first, an
existing regulatory regime, in this case for taxis, was not deregulated but disregarded by the
challenger, Uber, who flouted entry and price controls, often triggering cease and desist
orders from city regulators. A subsequent phase involves regulation and has occurred at
both city and state levels—in legislative and sometimes regulatory bodies—and also in
judicial venues. It conforms to an elite-dominated model of contending incumbent vs.
challenger interests, in which the latter has largely prevailed. In this model of challenger
capture, Uber has been able to defend its core interests of low prices, high driver supply
(with no labor regulation), and consumer trust. While Uber initially rejected all regulation, it
has most vigorously opposed those central to its business model of low-cost service with
dynamic pricing, frictionless entry of drivers, and no vehicle caps.
Uber regulation follows a pattern of elite-driven politics in which dispersed actors
(consumers and drivers) are weak and are represented primarily by surrogates. It is a
model of challenger capture, with the following traits:
•
•

•

•

•

Rather than deregulation per se, the hi-tech disrupter disregards existing
regulations, including barriers to entry and price controls.
Concentrated interests dominate the subsequent politics of regulation, in which the
disrupter has both substantial structural power and novel—as well as
conventional—forms of instrumental power and has defended its core interests.
Dispersed consumers depend on shifting alignments with concentrated interests.
Consumers are aligned with challengers on high supply and low cost of service—on
which Uber acts as a surrogate and mobilizes their support. They are aligned with
taxi incumbents, who fight for consumer protection and safety regulations.
Consumer interests have been addressed in legislative venues in a pattern of elitedriven politics.
Dispersed drivers are aligned with Uber on issues concerning Uber’s on-going
presence in a city, but, given any further lack of alignment with concentrated actors,
labor issues have been addressed primarily by surrogate actors in courts.
A dual regulatory regime has emerged, which preserves extensive regulations for
the incumbent taxi industry while creating much weaker regulations for the
challenger, Uber.

Uber is a particularly good case for analysis. To date, it has been subject to the most
regulatory attention and thus provides a good basis for empirical examination. Also, Uber is
a “most likely” case for high regulation in at least two ways. First, it enters a sector with a
strong regulatory regime and one that is defended by entrenched rent-seeking interests.
Second, Uber exercises a high degree of control over work conditions, a defining condition
of employee status, and it is thereby most susceptible to labor regulation and
misclassification lawsuits and rulings.9 To the extent regulations are limited in the Uber
case, they are unlikely to be enacted for other labor platforms. Strikingly, we find that this
“most likely” case has experienced only weak regulation.
9

Collier, Dubal, and Carter 2017.

4

The primarily qualitative analysis that follows uses several sources of data, including news
coverage and interviews with taxi interests, Uber drivers, Uber employees, plaintiffs’
attorneys, defense attorneys, labor advocates, legislators, and legislative aides.10 We use
case studies to examine the politics of city-level regulation. We then turn to regulation by
the states, analyzing an original database of all regulations passed between 2014 and 2016
and a case study of California, the first site of UberX as well as the first state to regulate it
and a particularly influential case of regulation.11 Finally, we examine judicial regulation
using a database of court dockets from 2012-2016 in federal and state courts in California,
Texas, and New York, and focus our discussion on the key “test” cases filed against Uber. It
should be noted that regulations generally refer to TNCs, or transportation network
companies, as platform-based ride-hailing companies have come to be called.
REGULATORY AGENDA
With the advent of Uber, a number of regulatory issues have been raised by stakeholders
and policy advocates, including taxi companies, foundations, NGOs, bloggers, and scholars.
Public officials have taken action on only a subset of these issues. Regulatory inaction
occurs either because of a failure to pass a proposed law or obtain a ruling in court, or
because issues have not even made it to the agenda in legislatures or brought to trial. To
assess the areas in which public officials have and have not acted, we compile a “regulatory
agenda” of the issues that have been proposed or enacted. We group them into five
categories (Table 1).
The first two categories reflect their labels: “safety” and “consumer protection.” These
regulations aim to protect Uber’s customers and the general public. Because Uber’s business
model depends on customer trust, the company has always provided its own driver
training, required background checks, and insisted on minimum vehicle standards.
However, these items remain on the regulatory agenda because regulators consider the selfimposed practices inadequate
In addition to their stated purpose, consumer protection and safety regulations also reflect
competitive issues in that they “level the playing field” between Uber and taxis. Indeed, taxi
interests often demand such regulations on competitive grounds. Uber vigorously opposes
some of these regulations, most notably fingerprint-based background checks, as a rigidity
in easy driver entry. Other issues are uniquely related to competition between Uber and the
taxi sector. We include these regulations as “other competition.”

10

We conducted more than two dozen interviews with taxi interests in San Francisco and New York, 215
surveys with Uber drivers in San Francisco, 25 in-depth semi-structured interviews with Uber drivers in San
Francisco, more than two dozen interviews with labor advocates from California and New York, 5 interviews
with legislators and legislative aides at the city level (San Francisco and Seattle) and the state level
(California).
11
The name “Transportation Network Company,” or TNC, was first officially used by California state
regulators.

5

Table 1. Regulatory Agenda
Category

Issue addressed

Groups benefitted

Background checks
Commercial licenses
Safety

Driver training
Decal visibility
Vehicle inspection regulations

Consumers, taxis

Non-discrimination
Fare disclosure
Consumer
Protection

Accurate fare calculation
Accessibility
Insurance requirements
Limit TNC sharing of consumer data
Permits and fees
Airport fees
Limits on surge pricing

Other Competition

Taxis

Caps on number of vehicles
Ban ride-pooling
Ban leasing of vehicles
Prohibit cash payments
Ban street hails

Worker protection

Employee status
Right to organize/bargain collectively
Income (wages and stability)
Transparent rankings & process of deactivation
Transparent earnings calculation
Dispute resolution mechanism
Driver privacy
Ban penalizing drivers who organize/protest
Prohibit discrimination against drivers

Drivers

Pollution
Reporting requirements
Public goods

Congestion
Coordination with public transit
Ride-pooling
Taxation
Data security and sharing

6

Public

Labor issues are also contentious, most saliently drivers’ legal classification as independent
contractors rather than employees who are protected by work laws, such as the minimum
wage, social security, right to unionize, and overtime pay. Those advocating employee status
point to Uber’s significant control over conditions of work, the legal condition for employee
status. Opposing reclassification and other labor regulation, Uber argues that it is not an
employer or even a transportation company, but a technology company that simply offers
the software that matches riders with drivers. Importantly, some labor issues can be
addressed without reclassification. Finally, we include a category of regulations that
address public goods, like congestion and public transit.
In the analysis that follows, we analyze the politics of regulating these categories in
different policy-making venues.
REGULATION BY CITY GOVERNMENTS
After taxis replaced for-hire horse carriages at the end of the 19th century, city governments
took primary responsibility for regulating the industry.12 A century later, when Uber and
other TNCs were launched in cities across the country, city officials debated the best way to
address these entrants, which were structured differently from the taxi sector and yet
provided the same service. In this section, we examine the way Uber enters markets using
an “act first, apologize later” strategy that flouts existing regulations. We then turn to a
number of hypotheses that relate city “types” to the regulatory response to this disruption.
Finally, we examine the strategies that Uber has employed to achieve its preferred
regulatory outcomes.
We examine eight cities using data gathered from an exhaustive review of online sources for
each city.13 Rather than a representative sample of cities, we select three types of cities to
explore hypotheses about city characteristics. We examine three steps: initial response to
Uber’s entry, subsequent regulations, and Uber’s response.
The first city type includes San Francisco, Seattle, and Austin: politically progressive cities
that are innovation hubs (Figure 1). These two traits (i.e., progressive and hi-tech) give rise
to two contradictory hypotheses. Such cities might be friendly to hi-tech interests, given
that hi-tech firms hold influence and account for a great deal of local economic activity.
Alternatively, as progressive cities, they may be more likely to regulate, especially with
respect to consumer protection, safety, and worker protection issues as well as public
goods.
The second group of cities—New York City, Chicago, and Philadelphia—have historically
strong 1) regulatory agencies and 2) incumbent taxi sectors. They are also older, large,
industrial cities with dense urban cores and captured regulatory regimes for the ridehailing industry.14 Therefore, they might be expected to do more to prevent Uber’s initial

12

Dubal 2017.
An internet search of Uber regulation in our cities yielded online versions of local and national newspapers
and other online publications/media sources as well as blogs.
14
San Francisco also has an entrenched taxi industry, but it is a smaller city and from the late 1970s-2009,
medallions were non-transferable and had no monetary value. Without medallions as high-value assets,
taxis had less lobbying power. See Dubal 2017.
13
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entry and to enact regulations that level the playing field, restrict supply, and inhibit driver
entry.
Finally, Houston and San Antonio are Sunbelt cities in the conservative state of Texas, a
category in which we can again consider Austin. Given their relatively recent growth and
lower density, we might expect them to have a less entrenched taxi sector and do less to
halt Uber’s initial entry, restrict car and driver supply, or pursue leveling with taxis.

●

Chicago
San Francisco ●
●

Seattle

●

Houston

● City
State

●

San Antonio
●

Austin

●

Pittsburgh

●

Philadelphia
●

New York City
−1.0

−0.5

0.0

0.5

Conservatism score

1.0

Figure 1. City and State Ideology (Public Preferences)
Source: Tausanovich and Warshaw 2013

Step 1: Disrupting regulation
Uber enters urban markets extra-legally, ignoring an extensive regulatory regime, which
includes, among others, barriers to entry and price controls; driver registration, licensing,
and insurance requirements; and consumer protection and safety regulations. Uber’s entry
thereby forces local or state governments to respond reactively to a fait accompli, after Uber
has established a base of customers and drivers.15 City officials are thus confronted with
two options: allow Uber to operate or ban it—through cease and desist orders and law
enforcement—until regulations are enacted.
The first issue for regulators is whether TNCs are technology companies, as TNCs insist, or
transportation companies, as the taxi sector insists. As tech companies, TNCs provide
software to match riders with private drivers. As transportation companies, they challenge
the incumbent taxi sector, which has benefited from the classic regulations of entry barriers
and price controls, thereby restricting supply, maintaining “high” prices, and supporting
driver income. How, then, do cities respond, when Uber introduces its app, allowing drivers
in their own cars to be algorithmically matched with a rider?

15

Griswold and Murphy 2016.
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We find that timing, more than city traits, seems to be the stronger predictor of responses to
Uber entry (Table 2). Where Uber launched in 2012 or 2013—San Francisco, Seattle, New
York, and Chicago—cities did little to prevent Uber’s operation upon entry. In the three
Texas cities and Philadelphia, Uber launched later—in 2014—after other cities and states

Table 2. Regulatory Steps by Cities
Step 1
Pre-Regulation:
Initial Response

Step 2

Step 3

Regulation: Notable features

Post-Regulation: Uber response

San Francisco

No action

None

NA

Seattle

No action

Vehicle caps; Driver
unionization

Austin

Police-enforced
ban

Fingerprinting

Houston

Police-enforced
ban

Fingerprinting

San Antonio

Police-enforced
ban

Fingerprinting

Philadelphia

Poorly enforced
UberX ban

Ban; earmarked taxes for
education (state-imposed)

New York
City

Brief ban

Extensive leveling (e.g.,
commercial licenses;
fingerprinting; driver
training; permits/fees)

Chicago

No action

Extensive leveling (e.g., fees
that are higher than taxis)

City

9

Successful Uber protest of cap;
formal challenge of unionization
ordinance
Leaves city after organizing and
losing public referendum on
fingerprinting. Successfully
lobbies state to overturn.
Initially accepts; then threatens
to leave city but remains.
Successfully lobbies state to
overturn.
Leaves city in response to
fingerprinting. City changes
regulation to make
fingerprinting optional.
Continues operating UberX
service despite ban. Successfully
lobbies state to overturn.
Successful mobilization against
vehicle caps proposed by mayor
but does not mobilize against
proposals enacted by regulatory
agencies.
Successful mobilization against
fingerprinting.

had begun to regulate; there, Uber’s entry was met with a ban. In Austin and Philadelphia,
Uber nevertheless continued to operate, aided by software that produced a fake version of
the Uber app to thwart regulators and law enforcement.16
Step 2: Regulating disruption
Cities must next decide how they will regulate Uber. As discussed above, we expect hi-tech
progressive cities to face counter-pressures; old, industrial cities to do more to harmonize
TNC regulations with those on taxis; and Texas cities to be Uber friendly. We focus on
regulations that have been particularly contentious for Uber.
Consistent with the contradictory predictions of hi-tech, progressive cities, the three cities
differ. San Francisco has taken a laissez-faire, tech-friendly approach with virtually no
regulation.17 Seattle has attempted two regulations that are central to Uber’s business
model. First, it imposed vehicle caps. However, it quickly backtracked following a strong
lobbying effort by Uber.18 Second, alone among US cities, it enacted labor regulations,
specifically the right of drivers to bargain collectively. This ordinance remains
unimplemented, as its legality is contested in court.19 Austin has adopted relatively high
levels of consumer protection regulation including fingerprinting, in a pattern that
conforms to the other Texan cities.
As hypothesized, regulatory agencies play a strong role in the old industrial cities,
particularly New York and Philadelphia. By contrast, regulatory attempts by elected
officials have been mostly unsuccessful. In New York, Mayor De Blasio was unable to impose
regulations (e.g., vehicle caps) that went beyond the extensive leveling rules passed by the
Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC).20 Politicians in Philadelphia also had a difficult time
contesting the authority of the Philadelphia Parking Authority (PPA), a longstanding agency
that has regulated taxis. The PPA was constrained only when the state legislature
intervened in 2016 to end the ban and preempt further city-level regulation.21 In Chicago,
ride-hailing is regulated by the Department of Business Affairs and Consumer Protection, an
agency with a broader mandate than New York’s TLC or Philadelphia’s PPA. This Chicago
agency has played a lesser role and the elected city council and mayor, a greater regulatory
role.
Also as hypothesized, regulations in the industrial cities have done the most to level the
playing field with taxis. New York went furthest, with TNCs facing many of the same
requirements as taxicabs, including driver training, fingerprint-based background checks,
and commercial licenses for drivers.22 Chicago adopted some regulations for TNCs that
exceeded those of taxicabs, such as higher city taxes on pick-ups and drop-offs at popular
tourist destinations. 23 As mentioned, TNCs were banned in Philadelphia—albeit
ineffectively—until late 2016.24
16

Isaac 2017a.
Rayle and Flores 2016.
18
Soper 2014.
19
Levy 2017.
20
Jorgensen and Bredderman 2016.
21
Laughlin 2017.
22
Sanchez 2015.
23
Barnes 2017.
24
Tanenbaum 2016.
17
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Finally, the Texas Sunbelt cities were predicted to be the least likely to regulate. Yet, San
Antonio, Austin, and Houston all implemented fingerprint-based background checks, which
Uber vehemently opposed.25 Below, we discuss the oppositional tactics of Uber, but note
here that in San Antonio, Uber’s extensive mobilization was effective, and the regulation
was overturned (as it was in the other two cities when state legislation was passed to
preempt local regulations).26
City regulation of Uber thus varies substantially. These cases mostly support our
hypotheses: the “cross-pressured” hi-tech, progressive cities did not follow a consistent
pattern. The old, industrial cities did not extend the taxi regulatory regime to TNCs, but they
did implement the most extensive leveling regulations, with specialized regulatory agencies
leading the way. The Texas cities departed from the hypothesized pattern in passing one of
the most contentious regulations—fingerprinting.
Uber has accepted certain consumer protection and safety regulations that are consistent
with its need to build customer trust. All of our cities, with the notable exception of San
Francisco, have implemented such basic regulations. However, other regulations have been
more contentious, and Uber has vigorously opposed those it fears will restrict the easy
entry of drivers and the supply of cars on the road, like fingerprint-based background
checks, vehicle caps, and, in the most extreme case, full bans. Each of our cities, except San
Francisco, 27 implemented at least one of these contentious regulations; however, in almost
every case these regulations have been subsequently overturned following Uber opposition
at the city or state level. Also contentious are labor regulations, which only Seattle has
addressed through legislation. Like labor issues, public goods regulations have also been
largely ignored. However, it should be noted that labor and public goods are beginning to
receive some attention: in late 2017 and early 2018 New York City regulators announced
that they are pursuing a wage floor for drivers and a vehicle cap to decrease congestion; San
Francisco’s mayor reached a deal with Uber and Lyft to create designated pick-up points to
decrease congestion; and Chicago imposed an additional tax on Uber to fund public
transit.28
Step 3: Uber strategies to influence city-level regulation
Uber has tried to influence or change regulatory outcomes through a combination of insider
(i.e. directly lobbying elected officials) and outsider (i.e. mobilizing drivers, customers, and
the public) strategies. The outsider strategies are particularly novel, taking advantage of
technological features of the platform economy.
The app provides both a list of drivers and customers and an efficient way of
communicating with them. It has been a powerful tool in mobilizing customers and drivers
to advocate for Uber’s position on regulatory matters by merely clicking a link. For instance,
in New York and Austin, Uber presented a new “view” of its app, designed to target officials
who had proposed vehicle caps and fingerprinting, respectively.29 When customers opened
the app, a pop-up message appeared, asserting that New York City Mayor Bill De Blasio and
25

Wear 2015.
Griswold and Grabar 2015.
27
The San Francisco city government issued a short-lived cease and desist order for UberCab in 2010 but
not on UberX.
28
Barone 2018. Rodriguez 2017; Flegenheimer 2015. Small 2017.
29
Tepper 2015; McGlinchy and Weber 2015.
26
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Austin Councilwoman Ann Kitchen were proposing regulations that would make it
impossible for Uber to operate. Customers were then provided a link to register their
opposition to the regulations.
In addition to this “clicktivism,” Uber has made extensive use of online petitions, which it
has publicized to drivers and customers. For example, to oppose the Philadelphia ban, Uber
organized a petition, which garnered 127,000 signatures.30 Uber also used the contact
information from petition signatories to automatically generate emails that opposed
regulations and that were sent to policymakers.31 The company has even initiated public
referenda, a strategy that resulted in the suspension of vehicle caps in Seattle but failed to
overturn fingerprint-based background checks, a consumer protection issue, in Austin.
These strategies have been enhanced by Uber’s extensive use of media. The company has
taken out ads in newspapers and on television to target public officials, like Councilwoman
Kitchen and Mayor De Blasio, and to publicize its referenda and online petitions.32 Finally,
outside of traditional mobilizing efforts, Uber has directly—and deceptively—manipulated
public opinion data available to local regulators. In some cities, the company has asked its
employees to devise computer programs that automatically respond to city-administered
surveys in a way favorable to the company.33
Uber’s strategies have been employed primarily against elected officials and have mostly
been successful. While the direct effects of these efforts cannot be meaningfully measured,
Uber’s goals were ultimately accomplished in defeating vehicle caps in Seattle and New
York City, in legalizing UberX in Philadelphia, and in eliminating fingerprint-based
background checks in the Texas cities.
Uber calculates strategically, and in its largest markets, it has ultimately accepted even the
regulations it most opposes. In the largest ride-hailing city, New York, Uber has accepted
fingerprinting and other regulations that are substantially equivalent to those on taxis—
with the important exceptions of vehicle caps and fare control. In Austin, Uber followed
through on its threat to leave in response to fingerprinting, but in Houston, the company
remained in the larger market, despite similar threats. 34 However, in both cities, the
requirement was subsequently overturned by Uber-supported state legislation.35
In other cities, Uber’s threats to leave a market have been an effective tool of overturning
regulations. Officials in San Antonio retracted a fingerprinting ordinance after Uber left the
city in protest, and in 2016, Chicago pulled a proposed fingerprinting ordinance following
Uber’s threat to leave the city.36 Regulatory agencies comprised of appointed officials, like
the TLC in New York and—for a while—the PPA in Philadelphia, have been less affected by
pressure brought by Uber and more prone to adopt and maintain regulations that Uber
opposes.
Thus, Uber succeeded everywhere in disrupting city ride-hailing regulatory regimes of
entry and price controls. In the subsequent process of regulating this disruption, cities have
30
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varied with respect to consumer protection, safety, and other competition regulations,
which were also initially violated. These have been less contentious because Uber depends
on consumer trust, which these regulations enhance. The high priority issues for Uber have
been those that challenge its business model of high and flexible supply, particularly vehicle
caps, fingerprint-based background checks, and drivers’ rights as workers. As a powerful
player with significant instrumental and structural power, Uber has prevented or defeated
almost all of these regulations.
REGULATION BY STATE GOVERNMENTS
States, which have historically played a limited role in regulating the taxi sector, have often
intervened to regulate TNCs. In fact, many states, having been lobbied by Uber, have
wrested control from cities, preempting municipal regulation.37 By December 2016, 38
states had passed TNC legislation. We analyze an original database of all state-level
legislation passed between 2014 and 2016, drawn from the Open States website. We test
several hypotheses about state-level characteristics and regulatory outcomes. We then turn
to a case study of California.
Like cities, states have generally acted in only three categories of the regulatory agenda—
consumer protection, safety, and other competition. States have not diverged significantly in
the emphasis given to each of these categories, with a high correlation in regulations passed
across categories (Table 3).
Table 3. Correlation of percent of regulations passed by category
Consumer
protection
Consumer
Protection

Other
competition

Safety

0.88

0.76

1

0.81

1

Other
competition
Safety

1

States tend to cluster into groups of “high” and “low” regulators (Figure 2). A number of
“usual suspects” might explain this variation. A first pair of hypotheses is that ideology and
partisanship may influence regulatory outcomes, with liberal, democratic states expected to
regulate more. A third hypothesis is that more urban states will regulate more because Uber
serves a larger share of the state’s population. Measures of ideology, partisanship,
37
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urbanization do not appear to be associated with level of regulation (Figures A1-A3).
Notably, regulations pass as bipartisan processes, with most bills garnering over 70 percent
support from both parties (Figure 3).
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Figure 2. Histogram of Total Number of Regulations (states that have regulated)
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Figure 3. Bipartisan Support of TNC Regulation

An examination of the content of regulations indicates that even “high” regulators are quite
moderate in the regulations they enact. Fingerprint-based background checks have been
passed in only one state, Kansas, which subsequently repealed the requirement. No state
has mandated vehicle caps, imposed a ban, or reclassified drivers as employees. Sometimes,
these regulations simply institutionalize practices Uber already follows (e.g., no cash
payment). As in cities, states primarily legislate on those consumer protection and safety
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requirements that Uber accepts because they are thought to increase consumer trust at a
minimal cost.
CALIFORNIA: THE FIRST STATE TO REGULATE
To illustrate the politics of Uber regulation, we examine the particularly contentious initial
regulation of TNCs in California, the first state to regulate. This instance of TNC regulation
demonstrates many of the political dynamics that have characterized subsequent regulatory
efforts, particularly the strength of concentrated private interests, the weakness of drivers
and customers as autonomous actors, and the strategies Uber uses to fight regulation.
The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) took the first step in 2013 by passing
insurance requirements for drivers with passengers, among other minimal consumer
protection and safety regulations.38 Regulation then moved to the state legislature following
the highly publicized death of six-year-old Sophia Liu, who was struck and killed by an Uber
driver in January 2014.39 The driver was logged into the app but not engaged in a ride and
thus not required by the CPUC to be covered by Uber’s commercial insurance policy. Since
the driver was using his car for commercial purposes, his personal insurance policy would
not cover the accident. In response to this “gap” in insurance coverage, the chair of the
Business and Consumer Protection Committee in the California State Assembly, Susan
Bonilla, proposed a law requiring commercial insurance whenever drivers were logged onto
the app.40
Private interests were active participants in the policy process. Taxi companies weighed in,
issuing written statements and lobbying legislators to regulate TNCs as they regulate taxi
companies on issues of consumer protection, safety, and public goods.41 However, they
were unable to achieve any leveling regulations beyond insurance requirements, an issue
on which they were aligned with insurance companies, which organized a coalition with
consumer advocates and personal injury lawyers in support of Bonilla’s bill and
participated in its drafting.42 Although influential, insurance companies are essentially a
one-issue actor.
Uber was extremely active in opposing the Bonilla bill. While it ultimately accepted
insurance regulations, it initially argued that personal insurance should cover drivers when
they have the app on but are not engaged in a ride. Uber opposed the requirement of
commercial insurance either as a cost to itself or one to drivers that would pose a barrier to
their entry.
Uber employed the dual insider-outsider strategy outlined above. It used its vast financial
resources to hire 14 of the top 15 lobbying firms in Sacramento, and it hired former Obama
campaign manager David Plouffe “to make sure…the right outcomes happen.” 43 Uber
enlisted the support of nonprofit public interest groups, most notably Mothers Against
Drunk Driving (MADD), to which Uber has donated a percentage of fares on major
38
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holidays.44 MADD sent letters to the governor and legislature opposing the Bonilla bill,
arguing that TNCs decrease drunk driving and that the proposed regulations would inhibit
the operation of this service.45 Uber also successfully sought lobbying assistance from highprofile Silicon Valley investors, like Ron Burkle and John Doerr, as well as celebrities, like
Ashton Kutcher, who bombarded Assembly members with phone calls.46
Uber’s outsider strategy to shape and mobilize public opinion was also multi-pronged. The
company hired nearly all of Sacramento’s public relations firms to improve its image and
sent pro-Uber material to newspapers throughout California. 47 As part of this publicoriented strategy, Uber also targeted legislators who supported or were undecided about
the bill. In one of the clearest instances of such a strategy, Uber targeted the bill’s sponsor
and launched a public campaign in the district where she planned to run for state Senate in
2015, claiming that she was anti-technology and a stooge of the insurance industry.48
As in cities, Uber used app-enabled clicktivism to mobilize consumers and drivers in a
campaign of pressure politics. Just before the vote on the California bill, Uber used its app to
tell customers that the proposed regulations threatened its operation in the state and
initiated a petition through the app.49 The company then contacted local news outlets to film
boxes of petitions being delivered to Assemblywoman Bonilla’s office.50
The California case illustrates the elite-driven policymaking pattern typical of Uber
regulation. Concentrated private interests were influential, particularly incumbents and
challengers, but also in this case, the insurance companies. Although a more comprehensive
bill was initially proposed, the final legislation included only weakened insurance coverage
requirements that correspond to a compromise amenable to both Uber and the insurance
industry. Customers and drivers, dispersed and unorganized, did not have autonomous
input into the policy process. To the extent they were participants, they were mobilized by
Uber on the basis of maintaining service and work. But they were mobilized against
regulations that may have benefited both groups: more extensive consumer protection for
consumers and Uber-provided commercial insurance for drivers.51
The case of California also illustrates Uber’s structural power. Policymakers value Uber’s
presence as a source of service and work, and fear disinvestment or withdrawal from the
market. Many also see regulatory policy as signaling either their welcoming or hostile
attitude toward innovation and hi-tech companies more generally. The fear of appearing
“anti-tech” and possibly losing future opportunities to attract and spur post-industrial
economic activity may be observed in the CPUC’s explicit initial regulatory language: “The
purpose of this Rulemaking is not to stifle innovation and the provision of new services that
consumers want.”52
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City-State Comparison
In general, states have become new regulators of for-hire transportation operating at the
municipal level. Typically more conservative than cities, states have regulated Uber more
lightly than cities have. A large number have preempted municipal regulation, and many
have introduced model legislation advocated by Uber.53 Only a few state legislatures have
passed regulations that explicitly allow cities to regulate TNCs.
That said, while cities have been somewhat bolder, disrupted regulation has been generally
Uber friendly in both cities and states. With the exception of insurance regulation in
California and a short-lived fingerprinting ordinance in Kansas, states, more than cities,
have avoided regulations that Uber most opposes. We find that cities have implemented a
number of these regulations, although most have been overturned in cities or states
following extensive mobilization by Uber.
State action conforms to Uber’s preference for uniform regulation rather than a “patchwork
of local regulations that [are] in conflict to [sic] each other.”54 Our database of state-level
regulation revealed that through 2016, twenty state laws had explicitly preempted
municipalities from implementing regulations on TNCs, both as a way to prevent cities from
implementing regulations that go further than the state and to overturn city-level
regulations.55 For example, as discussed above, the Texas legislation used preemption to
override fingerprinting ordinances passed by Austin and Houston. Other states, like
Pennsylvania, while not precluding all city-level regulations, passed laws to invalidate
specific city laws. Notably, while neither states nor cities have generally considered labor
regulation, a few states, including North Carolina, Arkansas, Michigan, Indiana, West
Virginia, Florida, and Ohio, have codified the status of TNC drivers as independent
contractors. Generally, then, preemption of city-level regulation by state legislatures has
resulted in regulatory outcomes that align with Uber’s preferences.
Finally, the states have often passed model legislation advocated by Uber. The first example
pertained to insurance. After opposing one another in the 2014 regulatory process in
California, the major insurance companies and the TNCs privately negotiated a compromise
bill as model legislation for other states.56 The insurance companies sought to prevent
drivers from using their personal insurance policy while driving and to take advantage of a
new market of TNC commercial drivers. After initial opposition in California, Uber and Lyft
saw a benefit in standard insurance requirements across states. The negotiated model
legislation advocated differential insurance requirements during the three stages of the
drivers’ work (i.e. before the rider is assigned, on the way to pick up a rider, and when a
rider is in the vehicle) with TNCs sharing responsibility for coverage with drivers. Of the 38
states that had regulated TNCs by 2016, over 75 percent have implemented the exact model
(Figure 4). More generally, model legislation addressing other issues has been proposed
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and circulated by TNC lobbyists and the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC).57
In several states, including Ohio, Texas, and Florida, public records unearthed by the
National Employment Law Program indicate that Uber wrote or co-wrote the state
legislation.58
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Uber Strategies
We have seen that Uber has been successful in entering markets and disrupting the ridehailing regulatory regime and has also been influential in shaping the subsequent regulation
of platform-based ride-hailing. It has done this by deploying a vast array of strategies,
which are enabled by Uber’s significant material resources, unique mobilizational capacity
through the app, and structural power as a source of jobs and hi-tech reputation.
Table 4 summarizes these strategies. Some strategies are associated with Uber’s
instrumental power while others are associated with its structural power. Instrumental
power can be used to influence legislators directly through insider strategies or indirectly
through outsider strategies. Insider strategies have been most prominent in models of
regulatory capture, and indeed they are key in Uber’s arsenal. Uber deploys significant
financial resources to undertake intense lobbying, particularly at the state level.
In both cities and states, Uber employs a number of outsider strategies, through which the
company influences policymakers through popular mobilization. Uber has mobilized its
drivers and customers to oppose regulations. While analysts like Walker have examined
such mobilizational efforts by firms, the technology of the app allows Uber to go even
further.59 The Uber app is itself a novel resource for mobilization of drivers and customers.
Further, Uber has mobilized the broader public through media campaigns and referenda.
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Table 4. Uber Strategies
Structural Power
Instrumental Power:
Insider
Strategies

Instrumental Power:
Outsider
Strategies

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Threats to leave markets
Hi-tech reputation
Hiring of lobbying firms and celebrities
Alliance formation with non-profit groups
(e.g., MADD)
Alliance formation with other interested
actors (e.g., insurance)
Clicktivism
Online petitions
Public relations strategies
Referenda
Targeting sponsors of regulation
Manipulation of public opinion data

Uber’s structural power is also notable and derives from its threats to disinvest and its
perceived economic benefits. Uber provides “flexible” work that accommodates many in the
21st century job market. Government decision-makers also see regulation in terms of the
city’s or state’s reputation as tech friendly, affecting future growth. The divestment threat is
a real one, as Uber has indeed left markets in response to the imposition of specific
regulations. Furthermore, Uber actively wields this threat, as it explicitly threatens that it
will leave a market.
JUDICIAL VENUES
As noted, regulation in cities and states, played out among regulators, incumbents, and
challengers, has been virtually silent on labor regulation. Yet, the labor-capital cleavage
within the challenger interest is a prominent one in the politics of TNC regulation. Online
driver forums indicate the many grievances that drivers have against Uber. Drivers
complain of fare cuts, lack of transparency in pay calculation, high expenses associated with
driving, fear of termination associated with Uber’s rating system, and lack of training and
driver support—many of which could be addressed through existing labor and employment
laws.60 The neglect in cities and states of worker protection issues reflects imbalance of
political influence and the collective action problems of dispersed drivers.
Legal analysts have suggested that politically weak groups “are almost always compelled to
resort to litigation,” and that litigation is “a technique to be employed when goals are clearly
unattainable in other political forums.”61 The Uber case comports with this theory of
political disadvantage. As atomized, dispersed actors, drivers are unable to bring effective
claims in legislative venues. Even in courts, worker protection issues are rarely brought
through the initiative of groups of drivers. Instead, most cases are brought by surrogates,
both plaintiffs’ attorneys who bring lawsuits against Uber on behalf of drivers and
60
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government agencies that investigate the company for violation of laws that would protect
drivers.
As a venue of regulation, judicial processes have a distinct logic. Unlike legislative venues,
where lawmakers can break new ground by passing laws, courts and administrative
agencies judge compliance with existing statutes, regulations, and previous judicial
decisions. Uber’s own approach to the law “as something to be tested” has, perhaps
unsurprisingly, resulted in much litigation.62
We focus here on lawsuits regarding worker protections and misclassification. These have
been a strikingly frequent form of litigation against Uber, constituting approximately onethird of all lawsuits against the company, as opposed to two to five percent of cases against
large multi-national tech companies.63 These cases reflect an intra-producer cleavage, the
classic struggle between labor and capital, which is an important component of the Uber
model of disrupted regulation.
We analyze a database of dockets across federal and three state courts (California, Texas,
and New York) from 2012-2016.64 These three states were chosen because they include
multiple cities with large Uber markets; because key test cases were filed in both California
and New York; and because they each represent different political and legal regimes with
regard to worker protections. California is a progressive state with an expansive, employeefriendly labor code; New York is also a progressive state but our review of state labor codes
indicates that it has fewer state worker protections; and Texas is a conservative state with
limited state labor protections. Unsurprisingly, California houses the largest number of
lawsuits against Uber alleging worker protection violations.
Reflecting the fact that drivers are an unorganized and atomized workforce, most cases are
not brought by groups of drivers but by surrogates, who typically conceive of the litigation
and then recruit worker plaintiffs (not vice versa).65 Prominent among these surrogates are
plaintiffs’ attorneys, who have brought class actions. Like all surrogates, class-action
attorneys act simultaneously “on behalf of” drivers but also in their own interests, resulting
in a biasing that has affected what issues have been litigated and how the litigation
proceeds. 66 Because private plaintiffs’ attorneys work on contingency, they have an
incentive to bring cases that may yield significant damages or large settlement sums.67 We
find that as a result, income-related claims are most commonly litigated against Uber, and
most cases have been settled or dismissed without resolving drivers’ employment status.68
These settlements are enabled by Uber’s significant material resources, and they undermine
any efforts to regulate Uber through courts. Other surrogate actors representing drivers’
interests in courts include government bodies and an NGO.
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We focus below on the most important “test” cases that were brought primarily in courts
but also in administrative and regulatory agencies.69The majority of these test cases involve
the misclassification of Uber drivers as independent contractors, a status that denies them
the labor and employment rights available only to employees.70 These cases attempt to
apply existing employee laws to the new case of Uber.71 We group these cases by the types
of rights litigated.
Income-related Claims
The vast majority of worker protection cases involve income-related claims. The most
important, O’Connor v. Uber, is a misclassification case filed in 2013 by Shannon LissRiordan in the Federal District of Northern California. Alleging misclassification of drivers,
the case certified a large class of drivers and, if successful, would have challenged Uber’s
independent-contractor business model.72 Many understood O’Connor as a test case for the
gig economy more generally.73 However, rather than take the case to trial, in 2016 LissRiordan attempted to settle on unfavorable terms.74 Indeed, the court subsequently rejected
the settlement as “unfair” to drivers.75 The case was then stymied by a 9th Circuit ruling,
which decertified a portion of the class, greatly diminishing its size and the potential impact
of this case.76 O’Connor has yet to be resolved.
NYTWA v. Uber was filed in federal court in New York in June 2016.77 The New York Taxi
Workers Alliance (NYTWA) is a 20-year-old NGO advocating for taxi drivers’ interests. The
NYTWA’s membership now includes a majority of Uber drivers.78 However, in many of its
actions, it continues to see Uber as a central threat. After having lost the regulatory battle to
extend vehicle caps and fare controls to Uber when it first entered New York, the NYTWA
turned to the judicial process. On behalf of a class of Uber drivers, it alleged minimum wage
and overtime violations (as well as unlawful equipment and tools deductions, and unlawful
tax and surcharge deductions). Like, O’Connor, these claims challenge the status of Uber
drivers as independent contractors. The NYTWA maintains that in the absence of city and
69
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state regulations that limit the number of TNC vehicles and control fares, employee status is
the only way to lift and stabilize the earnings of TNC and taxi drivers.79 The NYTWA had
never previously sought to establish employee rights for taxi drivers, who are also
independent workers, but rather worked through city and state regulatory bodies to
advance drivers’ interests, avoiding the issue of worker status.80 By making themselves a
plaintiff in this case alongside their Uber driver members, the NYTWA sought a settlement
or trial adjudication that would undercut Uber’s business model. However, the district
court dismissed the NYTWA as co-plaintiffs, claiming the organization lacked standing. The
case remains undecided.
Meyer v. Kalanick, a federal anti-trust action against Uber’s co-founder Travis Kalanick,
alleged that Uber’s mobile app amounts to a price-fixing conspiracy because it coordinates a
uniform price among Uber drivers. The impact of this lawsuit, which ultimately put to
question the classification of Uber drivers as independent contractors, was also stymied by
an appellate court ruling that sent the case to private arbitration.81
Finally, in three contexts not involving a legal challenge to drivers’ status as independent
contractors, Uber voluntarily agreed to pay drivers for overcharges or underpayment. One
was the result of a legal investigation into their leasing program by the Massachusetts
Attorney General.82 Another was prompted by revelations of improper earnings deductions
made public by the NYTWA.83 Yet another, in which Uber agreed to pay $20 million to
drivers misled by Uber’s exaggerated claims about earnings and vehicle financing, was
resolved after an investigation by the Federal Trade Commission.84 While drivers won
monetary gains in all three, none shifted the legal regulatory landscape with regard to
workers’ rights.
Job Security and Collective Action Claims
Two legal claims against Uber involve the rights of drivers to engage in collective action. In
February 2016, the National Labor Relations Board Region 20 began a national
investigation of Uber’s labor practices to assess whether Uber has misclassified its workers
as independent contractors under the National Labor Relations Act.85 This investigation
remains unresolved. Also, the NYTWA filed a claim with the NLRB alleging that Uber’s
arbitration provision for workers is an unfair labor practice because it prevents class action
lawsuits.86 The Supreme Court took up this legal question in late 2017.
Other Claims
Across the three states in this analysis, two cases against Uber allege discrimination. One
was dismissed. The other was filed as an individual Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) complaint, alleging that Uber’s ratings system—which can result in
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termination—has a racially discriminatory impact on minorities because of passengers’
biases.87 The resulting EEOC investigation has not been concluded or made public.
Individual Uber drivers in states across the country have filed individual claims in
administrative bodies alleging their own misclassification for purposes of unemployment
insurance, workers’ compensation, and unpaid wages. Individual claim-making is at most a
grievance procedure without larger impact.88 Under res judicata, administrative decisions
from these claims do not form precedent and have no consequences for other drivers. To
leverage these individual claims for broader regulatory purposes, in 2016 the NYTWA sued
the New York State Labor Department on behalf of three drivers who had filed individual
unemployment insurance claims but did not receive a timely response. As a remedy, the
NYTWA asked the Labor Department to audit Uber to determine whether drivers are
employees under New York state laws. The case was dismissed.89
Thus, important test cases have been brought on workers’ rights issues in judicial venues,
often by surrogate actors, including plaintiffs’ attorneys and an NGO, who bias
representation with their own interests, and government agencies, whose pro- or anti-labor
perspective varies. Despite the high level of control Uber exercises over work conditions, to
date, these judicial processes have not resulted in regulatory constraint on Uber’s labor
practices. They have been settled without resolution, stymied by arbitration provisions, or
remain mired in long processes.
Conclusion: Elite Politics of Disrupted Regulation and Challenger Capture
Uber’s brash “act first, apologize later” entrance into urban markets disrupted a highly
regulated ride-hailing sector that displayed the classic rent-seeking traits described in the
Stigler model of regulatory capture. Prior to Uber, private taxi interests enjoyed anticompetitive barriers to entry and price controls. The taxi regulatory regime, however, also
included public interest provisions in the form of customer and labor protections, safety,
and, occasionally, public goods. Its disruption following Uber’s entry raised key questions
for regulators about if and how to regulate Uber.
Uber has played an active role in achieving regulatory outcomes compatible with its
business model. Uber has enjoyed both structural and instrumental power and has had the
resources to deploy a stunning array of insider and outsider strategies. Its political strength
has made it especially influential in the legislative arena. In city councils and state
legislatures, it has succeeded in limiting consumer and safety regulations to those that
conform to its business model of growth, supply and price flexibility, and low-cost service
provision. In general, Uber has been able to influence regulations and, in those cases where
it initially fails, often to get them reversed. Worker protections, vigorously opposed by Uber,
87
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have rarely made it to the agenda in legislative arenas. Drivers’ issues have instead been
taken up as legal issues in judicial venues and have not resulted in broad regulatory change.
The Uber model of disrupted regulation is an elite-driven politics of challenger capture. The
major regulatory models in the literature are not good fits for this model. Most feature only
two interests—private vs. public, or equivalently, producer vs. consumer. Interest
alignment is more complex in the Uber case. The private interest is often divided, and the
private and public interest is not always opposed. Intra-producer conflict occurs along an
incumbent-challenger cleavage, which is primarily played out in the legislative arena, as
well as along a labor-capital cleavage, which is most often played out in judicial venues.
Atomized customers and drivers do not have autonomous power. They have benefited from
their alignment with private interests and have participated in the politics of regulation
primarily when mobilized by elite actors. Consumers and drivers are aligned with, and
mobilized by, Uber in the initial disruption or “deregulatory” step on issues of entry and
price controls, which ensure Uber’s continued presence in the market as a provider of a
service and jobs. In the subsequent TNC regulatory step, consumers are aligned with taxis
on some leveling issues, which has contributed to regulations addressing consumer
protection and safety. Drivers lack alignment with concentrated interests in legislative
arenas. As a result of this political disadvantage, labor issues are taken up in judicial venues
primarily by surrogates, but to date, without success.
Disrupted regulation has given rise to a dual regulatory regime of the ride-hailing sector in
cities across the country. Uber’s entry undermined the taxi regulatory regime not by the
adoption of deregulatory policy or non-implementation through “corrosion,” but by
disruption. The subsequent regulation bifurcated the ride-hailing sector by creating an
alternative classification of “TNC,” thus exempting Uber from taxi regulations.
The regulatory regime on taxi incumbents remains intact but no longer operates to their
advantage. On the contrary it puts taxis at a competitive disadvantage relative to the
regulations (or lack thereof) for TNCs. The politics of regulating the new entrants has thus
been one of challenger capture.
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